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Miller: Assistance of Counsel

COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Berroa 1
(decided November 21, 2002)
Dario Berroa was convicted of murder in the second degree
and was sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison.2 He
appealed his conviction, and argued that he was deprived his
constitutional right of "conflict-free" counsel under both the Sixth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution 3 and Article 1, Section 6
of the New York State Constitution. 4 The Appellate Division,
Second Department rejected Berroa's "ineffective assistance of
counsel claim" and affirmed his conviction. 5 A dissenting Justice,
however, granted the defendant leave to appeal his ineffective6
assistance of counsel claim to the New York Court of Appeals.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's
decision and held that defense counsel's stipulation 7 had the effect
of creating and enhancing the attorney-client conflict, which had "a
substantial relation to the conduct of the defense." 8 Accordingly,
the case was remanded to the lower court for a retrial. 9
Berroa was charged with murder in the second degree and
related offenses that stemmed from a killing that occurred in June
199 N.Y.2d 134, 782 N.E.2d 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d 12 (2002).
2 Id. at 138, 782 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ...have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense."
4 N.Y. CONST. art. I., § 6 provides in pertinent part: "In any trial in any court
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and
with counsel .. "
5Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 138, 782 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
6id.
7 Id. at 137, 782 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 14. Defense's stipulation
read:
It is stipulated and agreed by [defense counsel] that prior to
their appearing in New York to give testimony in this case,
[the defense witnesses] had spoken with her and that neither
Miss Santiago and Miss Torres told [defense counsel] that the
defendant Dario Berroa had been in Philadelphia specifically
on June 2 2nd 1994.
Id.
8 Id. at 142, 782 NE.2d at 1155, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
9Id. at 143, 782 NE.2d at 1155, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
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of 1994.10 At trial, the defense offered a misidentification theory."
Prior to the start of the defendant's case, the prosecutor sought
confirmation that a "no alibi" defense would be used because the
required notice of alibi 12 had not been filed. 13 Additionally, the
prosecutor understood a misidentification defense could also
implicate an alibi for the defendant. 14 However, defense counsel
assured the court that an alibi witness would not be offered
because defense witnesses, including the defendant, could not
15
recall their whereabouts during the time of the shooting.
Moreover, defense counsel explained that the witnesses' testimony
was being proffered to show that at the time of the shooting, the
6
defendant had a "distinctive yellow-orange" hair color.'
The testimony of the prosecution's key witnesses included
the deceased's brother and two-eye witnesses, who testified that
17
the defendant shot the victim at "point blank range.'
Additionally, these witnesses testified that the defendant's impetus
for the shooting was a "drug turf dispute" and that the defendant
had black hair and unique green eyes. 18 Thereafter, the defense
sought to establish its misidentification defense.' 9 The defendant
called two witnesses, Vivian Rivera and Iris Santiago. The
defendant's girlfriend, Iris Santiago, testified that the defendant's
1oBerroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 135, 782 N.E.2d at 1149, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
11Id.
12 N.Y. C.P.L. § 250.20 (McKinney 2002) Notice of alibi provides in pertinent
part:
[T]bat if the defendant intends to offer a trial defense that at
the time of the commission of the crime charged he was at
some place or places other than the scene of the crime, and to
call witnesses in support such defense, he must, within eight
days of service of such demand [by the people] ... a "notice

of alibi" reciting (a) the place or places where the defendant
claims to have been a the time in question, and (b) the names,
the residential addresses, the places of employment and the
addresses thereof of every such alibi witness upon whom he
intends to rely.
3
1 Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 136, 782 N.E.2d at
1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 14.

14Id.

15Id.

[d.
"7Id. at 135, 782 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
18 Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 136, 782 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 14.

16

19 Id.
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hair color had been yellow-orange since 1992. 20 However, Miss
Santiago's testimony revealed an alibi for the defendant. 2 1 She
indicated that two days before the murder, she and the defendant
were in Philadelphia and they remained there until two days after
the shooting. 22 The court informed defense counsel that Miss
Santiago's testimony was problematic because it provided an alibi
that had not been previously revealed to the prosecutor. 23 The
court, however, allowed the witness's testimony but reserved its
ruling with respect to the defendant's newly uncovered alibi.24
Following the close of the defendant's girlfriend's
testimony, the court requested counsels' input on how to
"proceed. 25 Defense counsel made clear that she had not
encouraged any of the defense witnesses' silence regarding the
alibi and further stated none of the defense witnesses previously
questioned had been able to recall their whereabouts on the day of
the shooting. 26 On the other hand, the prosecution requested that
the testimony of the defendant's girlfriend should be admissible
and alluded to the fact that the prosecution would attempt to
discover when she first disclosed the defendant's alibi.27
Furthermore, defense counsel explained that none of the attorneys
working on the case requested silence on the part of any witness,
and therefore, assistance from defense counsel to clarify the
confusion was unnecessary. 28 Intervening, the court expressed its
reservations about the possibility of defense counsel being called
as a witness and warned that "it was not desirable for defense
counsel to be called as a witness to impeach any of the defense
witnesses." 29 Consequently, the trial was allowed to resume after
20

id.

21

id.

22

Id.

23

Berroa, at 136, 782 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
Id.

24
25

id.

26

id.

27

Id. But see People v. Dawson, 50 N.Y.2d 311, 317, 406 N.E.2d 771, 774,

428 N.Y.S.2d. 914, 918 (1980) (stating that "an alibi witness is under no
obligation to come forward . . . such silence may not be used as a means of
discrediting the witness's testimony, either upon cross-examination or during .
summation.").
28 Berroa,99 N.Y.2d at 137, 782 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
29 Id.
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defense counsel indicated that she would be amendable to a
stipulation asserting that she was not aware of an alibi prior to
trial.3 ° Upon resumption of the trial, both of the defense witnesses
testified that they had informed defense counsel of the alibi prior to
the start of the trial.3 ' Similarly, the defendant testified that he had
yellow-orange hair and that he was in Philadelphia at the time of
this fact until after hearing
the shooting, although he did not recall
32
witnesses.
defense
of
the testimony
At the end of the defense's case, the court and defense
counsel drafted a stipulation 33 in which defense counsel denied
having any knowledge of the existence of an alibi prior to the start
of the trial.34 This stipulation35 was then read to the jury prior to
the prosecution's rebuttal case. 36 During closing arguments,
defense counsel continued to assert its misidentification defense
and stated that the jury could consider the alibi testimony, but
should also take into consideration her stipulation when weighing
of the alibi testimony. 37 The jury returned a verdict
the credibility
38
of guilty.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the defendant argued
that he was deprived of his constitutional right of effective
assistance of counsel because there was a conflict of interest when
his attorney stipulated that she was unaware of the defendant's
alibi prior to the start of the trial.39 In addition, the defendant
argued that the stipulation transformed his advocate into his
adversary, so as to set his advocate's credibility in opposition to
the credibility of the other defense witnesses. 40 The Court of
Appeals agreed with the defendant and reversed and remanded for
a retrial. 4 ' The court opined that the conflict that confronted
30

Id.

31 Id. at 137, 782 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
32

id.

33 See supra note 7.
34 Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 137, 782 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
35 See supra note 7.
36

Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 137, 782 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 15.

37 Id. at 138, 782 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
38

id.

39 id.

40

id.

41 Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 139, 782 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
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defense counsel was not one of competing loyalties, but the fact
that she was the only source capable of impeaching the other k'
defense witnesses and "thus stood to be called as a witness.
Consequently, defense counsel had an ethical obligation 43 to
withdraw from acting as the defendant's advocate when it became
apparent that she was in a position to be called as a witness "on a
significant issue other than on behalf of the client" and it was
blatantly obvious that the testimony would be "prejudicial to the
client."" Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals held that as a
the defendant was deprived of meaningful
matter of law
45
representation.
The focus of the court's analysis was the attempted
rectification of the dilemma that unfolded before the court with the
testimony of the defendant's witnesses and not the reason for the
disclosure by defense counsel.46 The court explained "the right to
is
effective assistance of counsel in a criminal proceeding 47
Constitutions."
Federal
and
York
New
the
by
guaranteed
Additionally, the court in rejecting the People's argument that "a
testimonial stipulation may constitute a legitimate trial strategy
even when the facts stipulated may be prejudicial to the

id.
22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1200.2 1(d) (McKinney 2002) provides in pertinent part:
If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending
litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that the lawyer or a
lawyer in his or her firm may be called as witness on a
significant issue on behalf of the client, the lawyer may
continue the representation until it is apparent that the
testimony is or may be prejudicial to the client at which point
the lawyer and the firm must withdraw form acting as an
advocate before the tribunal.
Id.; see also, People v. Papemo, 54 N.Y.2d 294, 299-300, 445 N.E.2d 797, 800,
445 N.Y.S.2d 119, 122 (1981). But see S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. P'ship v. S.
H. Corp., 69 N.Y.2d 437, 443 508 N.E.2d 647, 650, 515 N.Y.S.2d 735, 738
(1987) (holding that the Code establishes ethical standards to guide attorneys
and they are not to be applied rigidly or as though they are controlling statutory
authority or decisional law).
44 Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 139, 782 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
41 Id. at 143, 782 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
46 Id. at 138, 782 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
42

43

47 Id.
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defendant, 4 8 asserted "[o]ur State standard for effective assistance
of counsel 'has long been whether the defendant was afforded
meaningful representation.'' 49 The New York courts in adopting
the meaningful representation standard focus on the "fairness of
the process as a whole rather than its particular impact on the
outcome of the case. ' 50 Therefore, the fact that the defendant may
have been acquitted but for the attorney's error's is not dispositive
under the meaningful representation standard. 5 '
In People v. Baldi,52 the New York Court of Appeals
reversed the appellate division's decision and reinstated both
orders of conviction, stating that the right to effective assistance of
41

Id. at 140, 782 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 17; see also, People v.

Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 151, 429 N.E.2d 400, 407, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 900 (1981);
State v. Crespo, 718 A.2d 925, 938, 940 (Conn. 1998) (holding that there was no
conflict of interest where the defense attorney stipulated to facts regarding his
participation in the initial investigation, but constituted a legitimate trial tactic);
People v. Beals, 643 N.E.2d 789, 792-94 (Ill. 1994) (holding that the use of
stipulations by defense counsel regarding the description of the shooter and that
defendant wore a red Addidas jacket during an argument prior to the victim's
shooting did not amount to a conflict of interest or the deprivation of effective
assistance of counsel but was the result of legitimate trail tactics, and thus, the
defendant failed to overcome the "strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance").
49 Id. at 138, 782 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 15 (emphasis added)
(quoting People v. Henry, 95 N.Y.2d 563, 565, 744 N.E.2d 112, 113, 721
N.Y.S.2d 577, 578 (2000); People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y2d 708, 712, 697
N.E.2d 584, 587, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 632 (1998)); see also People v. Henry, 95
N.Y.2d 563, 565 744 N.E.2d 112, 113, 721 N.Y.S.2d 577, 578 (2000); People v.
Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 712, 697 N.E.2d 584, 587, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 632
(1998); People v. Satterfield, 66 N.Y.2d 796, 799, 488 N.E.2d 834, 836, 497
N.Y.S.2d 903, 906 (1985).
50 Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d at 714, 697 N.E.2d at 588, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 633; see
also Strickland v. Wash., 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984) (articulating the federal
standard, which requires a defendant to show (1) that the attorney's performance
was deficient, and (2) but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a
reasonable probability the outcome of the proceedings would have been
different in order to overcome the strong presumption of effective
representation.) Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that "the touchstone
of the second prong of the analysis is whether counsel's performance rendered
the proceeding fundamentally unfair or left an unreliable result. Henry, 95
N.Y.2d at 566, 744 N.E.2d at 114, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 579 (quoting Lockhart v.
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993)).
s1Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d at 714, 697 N.E.2d at 588, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
52 54 N.Y.2d at 137, 429 N.E.2d at 400, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
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counsel as guaranteed by both the Federal and New York State
Constitutions is not quantifiable, but must be evaluated according
to the particular circumstances of each representation.53 After
being convicted of murder in the second-degree and attempted
murder in two separate trials, the defendant argued that he had
been denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney
testified as a witness regarding his observations of the defendant's
composure during police interviews.5 4 During the interviews, the
defendant confessed to the murder of a fifteen year old girl along
with three other murders and ten assaults on women, in addition to
the prior attempted murder5 5of a police officer, which stemmed
from the burglary of a home.
In rejecting Baldi's claim, the court stated that its most vital
concern in reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims was
to avoid "confusing true ineffectiveness with mere losing tactics
and according undue significance to retrospective analysis." 56 The
court explained that satisfaction of the constitutional requirement
of meaningful representation must not be viewed in hindsight, but
at the time of the actual representation. 57 Based upon the evidence,
law, and circumstances of the particular case, it must be
established that the attorney represented the client to best of his
ability. 8
Although, defense counsel may have offered
contradictory evidence with respect to his client's position, it was
done in an attempt to establish the insanity defense, and in
addition, defense counsel was not the only source of the
incriminating evidence against the defendant. 59 Thus, the decision
by the defense attorney to take the stand was "consistent with and
strengthened the insanity defense" asserted at trial and helped to
" Id. at 146, 429 N.E.2d at 404, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
14 Id. at 143-44, 429 N.E.2d at 403,
444 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
" Id. at 141, 144, 429 N.E.2d at 402, 403, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 895, 896. In
evaluating whether or not the defense counsel has been diligent in safeguarding
his client's right the court explained that it would be remiss to require a defense
counsel not to allow his client to cooperate with the police where the client is
being offered immunity regarding other crimes. Id. at 150, 429 N.E.2d at 40607, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 899-900.
56 Id. at 146, 429 N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
" Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d at 147, 429 N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
58 Id.
'9

Id. at 148-49, 429 N.E.2d at 405-06, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 898-99.
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60
lessen the prejudicial effect of the evidence against his client.
Therefore, it was a tactical approach, although a losing one, chosen
by counsel, who made a "valiant effort to establish his client's lack
of criminal responsibility." 61 Thus, the court determined that
tactical errors in hindsight must not be escalated into ineffective
assistance of counsel.62
Likewise, in People v. Harris,63 the New York Court of
Appeals explained that in order for a defendant to prevail on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must
demonstrate that a potential conflict of interest existed and the
conduct of his defense was affected by the operation of the
conflict. 64 A mere showing of a substantial possibility of the
existence of a conflict, without more, will not suffice to prove that
the defendant is entitled to a reversal and a new trial.65 The Harris
court rejected the defendants' ineffective assistance of counsel
argument and affirmed their convictions. 66 The court held that
there was no indication that the representation by the attorney was
compromised by the potential conflict, even though the
defendants' attorneys had previously represented the confidential
informant as well as the prosecution's chief witness. 67 However,
the court did note that the better practice would have been to
conduct a hearing to investigate the potential conflict; nonetheless,
the court did not commit reversible error by not doing so. 68
Additionally, New York courts reject the stricter federal
standard of ineffective assistance of counsel. The federal standard
requires the defendant to show prejudice in the outcome of the
process in order to overcome the strong presumption of effective
assistance of counsel and to adhere to the application of the
meaningful representation test.69
However, the New York

Id. at 148, 429 N.E.2d at 406, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
Id. at 151, 429 N.E.2d at 407, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
62 Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d at 151, 429 N.E.2d at 407, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
63 99 N.Y.2d 202, 783 N.E.2d 502, 753 N.Y.S.2d 437 (2002).
60

61

64
65

Id. at 210, 783 N.E.2d at 506, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 441.

People v. Alicea, 61 N.Y.2d 23, 31, 459 N.E.2d 177, 181, 471 N.Y.S.2d.68,

72 (1983).
66 Harris, 99 N.Y.2d at 211-12, 783 N.E.2d at 502, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 437.
67 Id. at 212, 783 N.E.2d at 502, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 437.
68

id.

69 See supra note 46.
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Constitutional standard of meaning representation includes the
prejudicial element to ensure that the process as a whole is
fundamentally fair as opposed to the "particular impact on the
outcome of the case.",70 Thus, there is no requirement for the
defendant to show "specific" prejudice in an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim in the New York courts. 7' Therefore, in New
York, the court must examine whether the potential conflict
actually affected the conduct of the defense, so as to make the
defendant's right to a fair trial prejudiced.72 Thus, the trial judge
plays a very distinct and vital role in assuring that a defendant has
not had his right to a fair trial compromised.73
The prosecutor in Berroa argued that a stipulation by
defense might be a legitimate trial strategy and sought to use
People v. Beals74 and State v. Crespo75 as precedent for its
assertion. 76 In Beals, the Illinois Supreme Court applied the
federal standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, and held
that the defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel.78 In order to assert an effective
under the federal standard, the
assistance of counsel claim
79
establish:
must
defendant
1. That counsel's performance was deficient, which
requires a showing of severe errors so that counsel

70

Henry, 95 N.Y.2d at 565, 744 N.E.2d at 114, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 579; see also,

Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d at 714, 697 N.E.2d at 588, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 633; People v.
Ortiz, 76 N.Y.2d 652, 657, 564 N.E.2d 630, 633, 563 N.Y.S.2d 20, 23 (1990);
Alicea, 61 N.Y.2d at, 30, 459 N.E.2d at 181, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
71 Ortiz, 76 N.Y.2d at 657, 564 N.E.2d at 633, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 23.
72 Id. at 657, 564 N.E.2d at 634, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 24; Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d at
713, 697 N.E.2d at 588, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
73 See, McDonald, 68 N.Y.2d at 12-13, 496 N.E.2d at 849, 505 N.Y.S.2d
at
830; People v. Mattison, 67 N.Y.2d 462, 468, 494 N.E.2d 1374, 1377, 503
N.Y.S.2d 709, 712 (1986); People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 313, 342 N.E.2d
550, 553, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1975).
74 643 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. 1994).
7'718 A.2d 925 (Conn. 1998).
76 Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 140, 782 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
77 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
78 Beals, 643 N.E.2d at 795.
79Id. at 793 (citing Strickland,466 U.S. at 687).
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was not functioning as80the "counsel" guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment.
That the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense such the severity of the errors deprived the
of a fair trial, resulting in reliable
defendant
8'
results.

Thus, if the defendant is unable to make a showing of both
components, it cannot be ruled that the conviction was a result of a
breakdown in the adversary process, which rendered unreliable
results. 82 However, the defendant must be able to show that the
outcome of his case was prejudicial as a result of counsel's conflict
of interest. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that the
defendant failed to show that "'but for' defense counsel's
stipulations, the outcome of the defendant's trial would have been
different." 83 Therefore, in Beals, the defendant failed to overcome
was within a "wide
the strong presumption that counsel's conduct
84
assistance."
professional
reasonable
range of
Additionally, in Crespo, the defendant appealed his
conviction of murder, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel
because of his attorney's participation in the initial investigation.85
The Supreme Court of Connecticut held there was no denial of

80

Id. at 794. (explaining that the defendant was unable to satisfy this prong of

the test because counsel's stipulation effectively prevented the State from calling
the defendant's sister as a witness against the defendant, thereby minimizing the
prejudicial
effect of the inconsistent statements.)
81
Id. at 794 (explaining that the defendant failed to satisfy the first prong, and
that the reviewing court need not consider the prejudicial effect on the outcome
of the trial because "the reviewing court dispose of the claim by applying either
component and, if it is not prove[n], need not consider the other component");
see also, Strickland,466 U.S. at 697.
82 Beals, 643 N.E.2d at 794.
83 id.
84

85

Id., see also Strickland,466 U.S. at 689.
Crespo, 718 A.2d at 935. Crespo's attorney, after being informed by the

defendant in the presence of the defendant's brother in-law and sister that he had
killed the victim and where the body was located, contacted the office of the
state's attorney, drafted a written consent to search the storage bin where the
body was located and provided the key to the bin, as well as informed the police
that the person who provided the key was in his office. Id.
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"conflict-free" assistance of counsel. 86 The Supreme Court of
Connecticut further explained that in order for a defendant to
establish a violation of his Sixth Amendment right, he must
overcome a two-pronged analysis.8 7 Firstly, the defendant must
establish that counsel was actively representing conflicting
interests, and secondly, the defendant must show that the actual
conflict had an adverse impact on his representation. 88 In this case,
the court reasoned that the defendant failed to demonstrate that his
"attorney's conflict of interest impeded [the] paramount duty of
loyalty" to him. 89 Therefore, Supreme Court of Connecticut
determined that it was possible for the trial court to conclude that
the defense attorney's stipulation was in the best interest of the
defendant and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel
because based upon the record, the prosecutor
could have proven
9°
every essential fact in the stipulation.
The New York Court of Appeals stated in People v.
McDonald,9 1 that the role of the trial judge in ensuring that the
right to effective assistance of counsel and the right to retain
counsel of one's choice do not clash. 92 The court held that
although the initial burden lies with defense counsel to recognize
the existence of a potential conflict of interest and to alert the
defendant to such conflict in order to obtain the client's informed
consent to continue the representation in lieu of the risks, the
prosecutor is also obligated to inform the court of any possible
conflicts that may be inferred from facts within his or her
possession. 93 Moreover, the trial judge also owes the defendant an
86
17

Id. at 937.
Id. at 938.

88 Id.
89

Id.

at 939.

Crespo, 718 A.2d. at 939-40.
9' 68 N.Y.2d 1, 496 N.E.2d 844, 505 N.Y.S.2d 824 (1986).
92 Id. at 8, 496 N.E.2d at 847, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 827; Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d
at
313, 342 N.E.2d at 553, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 769. But Cf, Berroa, where the New
York Court of Appeals did not address the defendant's argument that the
attorney failed to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to
"conflict-free" counsel. Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 143, 783 N.E.2d at 1148, 753
N.Y.S.2d at 19, n3. The court found that the defendant was denied his
constitutional right of effective assistance of counsel under both the Federal and
New York Constitutions. Id. at 143, 783 N.E.2d at 1148, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
93 McDonald, 68 N.Y.2d at 8, 496 N.E.2d at 847, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
90

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

11

Touro Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [2014], Art. 4

226

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 19

independent duty to protect his or her constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel.9 4 Therefore, the trial judge is
required to conduct a "record inquiry" hearing so as to inform a
defendant of the possibility or existence of a possible conflict and
give the defendant the opportunity to seek new counsel, thus
waiving his right to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel
argument. 95 Thus, the McDonald court determined that the trial
judge should have conducted an independent inquiry 96 after being
notified that defense counsel also represented the company, 97 and
therefore, held that the defense counsel "labored under an actual
conflict" by representing both the defendant and the company, who
was the victim in the instant case. 98 Additionally, the court stated
that it was the defendant's decision, not the attorney's, to decide if
he would accept the risks associated with the attorney's strategy on
how best to impeach the People's principle witness, who was the
secretary-treasurer of the company that defense counsel also
represented. 99
In summation, although a defendant is guaranteed the right
to effective assistance of counsel under both the Federal and New
York State Constitutions, the standard that will be used to
determine the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim
94 id.
9' Id. at 8, 496 N.E.2d at 847, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 827 (citing Gomberg, 38
N.Y.2d at 315, 342 N.E.2d at 555, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 769); see also, People v.
Lombardo, 61 N.Y.2d 97, 102, 460 N.E.2d 1074, 1075, 472 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590
(1984); Harris, 99 N.Y.2d at 211, 783 N.E.2d at 502, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 437;
Mattison, 67 N.Y.2d at 468, 494 N.E.2d at 1377, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 712; People v.
Krausz, 84 N.Y.2d 953, 955, 644 N.E.2d 1377, 1378, 620 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822
(1994).
96 The trial judge is required to conduct an inquiry on the record, known
as a
Gomberg inquiry, of each and every defendant whose defense is potentially
subject to a conflict of interest, so as to ascertain whether or not the defendant is
aware of the potential risks involved, and if the defendant is knowingly choosing
to proceed under such risks, thereby waiving an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim on appeal. McDonald, 68 N.Y.2d at 8, 496 N.E.2d at 847, 505 N.Y.S.2d
at 827 (citing Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d at 315, 342 N.E.2d at 555, 379 N.Y.S.2d at
769).
97 Defendant James McDonald was charged with arson in the third degree
for
intentionally setting fire to a shed belonging to the Lyell Exchange Lumber
Company. McDonald, 68 N.Y.2d at 4, 496 N.E.2d at 844, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
9' Id. at 9, 496 N.E.2d at 848, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
99 Id. at 12, 496 N.E.2d at 849, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
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will depend on which tribunal the case is tried in. If the defendant
brought the challenge under the New York State Constitution, the
defendant will be provided with a more flexible standard by which
his allegation will be viewed.1' ° However, if the challenge is
brought under the Federal Constitution, the defendant will be faced
101
with a much stricter approach in evaluating the claim.
Additionally, the focus of the inquiry is entirely different within
the two systems-the State of New York's focus as previously
noted, is on the overall fairness of the proceeding.102 whereas the
federal focus is based upon whether the attorney's perceived
deficient performance had a prejudicial impact on the case's
result. 10 3 Furthermore, the New York courts, unlike the Federal
courts, have refused to invoke a harmless error analysis with
respect to challenges brought under an ineffective assistance of
counsel argument. 04 Therefore, a finding that "but for" the errors
committed by coungel, the defendant would have been acquitted is
not dispositive under New York's constitutional guarantee of
effective assistance of counsel, however, under the federal standard
it may be a dispositive determination.'°5
Marcia Miller

Henry, 95 N.Y.2d at 565, 744 N.E.2d at 113, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 578; Baldi,
1oo
54 N.Y2d at 146, 429 N.E.2d at 404, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
'o'
Henry, 95 N.Y.2d at 566, 744 N.E.2d at 114, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 579; Beals,
643 N.E.2d at 504; Crespo, 718 A.2d at 938.
"02Henry, 95 N.Y.2d at 566, 744 N.E.2d at 114, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
103 Id.

104Benevento,
105 Id.;

91 N.Y.2d at 714, 697 N.E2d at 588, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 633.

Beals, 643 N.E.2d at 794.
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